Requirement 4 of PCI DSS asks you to protect card numbers with strong cryptography whenever they travel over an open, public network. The internet is the obvious one, but Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cellular, and satellite links count too. In practice that means your website, payment APIs, and any other connection carrying card data must use a current version of TLS with strong settings and a valid, trusted certificate. It also means card numbers must never be sent in readable form by email, chat, or text message.

What counts as an open, public network?

Any network you don't fully control, where someone else could be listening. PCI DSS gives the internet, wireless technologies such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, cellular technologies, and satellite communications as examples. A card number typed into your checkout page crosses the internet. A payment entered on a tablet and sent to your back office over the shop's Wi-Fi crosses a wireless network. A card terminal that sends transactions through a cellular modem crosses a cellular network. All of these are covered. Traffic that stays entirely on your own wired internal network falls outside Requirement 4, although encrypting it as well is good practice.

What does Requirement 4.2.1 actually require?

Requirement 4.2.1 is the heart of this section. It says that when card numbers are sent over a public network, only trusted keys and certificates are accepted, the certificates in use are confirmed as valid and not expired or revoked, the protocol supports only secure versions and settings with no fallback to insecure ones, and the encryption strength suits the method in use. The no-fallback part catches a lot of servers. A site that offers TLS 1.3 but will still agree to TLS 1.0 when a client asks for it doesn't meet the requirement, because the weak version is still there for anyone who wants to use it.

Does TLS 1.2 still meet Requirement 4?

Yes, as long as it is set up well. The requirement itself doesn't name a TLS version. It asks for strong cryptography, and today that means TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3. TLS 1.2 is fine with strong cipher suites, such as AES-GCM or ChaCha20 with forward secrecy, and with old options like RC4, 3DES, and export-grade ciphers turned off. TLS 1.3 removes most of those weak options by design, so it is the easier one to get right. SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, and TLS 1.0 don't count as strong cryptography and fail an ASV scan. TLS 1.1 was formally deprecated in 2021 and scanners flag it too, so turn it off as well.

What became mandatory after 31 March 2025?

Two parts of Requirement 4 were best practice until 31 March 2025 and are now required. The first is the certificate check in 4.2.1: you must confirm that the certificates protecting card numbers in transit are valid and not expired or revoked. The second is Requirement 4.2.1.1, which asks you to keep an inventory of the trusted keys and certificates you use to protect card numbers in transit. For a small business that list may be short: the certificate on your website, the one on your payment API if you have one, and any VPN certificates. Write down where each one is used, who issued it, and when it expires. That list is also the simplest way to stop a certificate from expiring without anyone noticing.

How should wireless networks be secured?

Requirement 4.2.1.2 says wireless networks that carry card numbers, or that connect to the card data environment, must follow industry best practices for strong encryption and authentication. Today that means WPA2 at a minimum, with WPA3 preferred where your equipment supports it. WEP and the original WPA are broken and don't qualify. If you run guest Wi-Fi on the same internet connection, keep it fully separate from any network where card data moves. Requirement 1 covers how to separate networks.

Can I send card numbers by email or text?

Only if the card number itself is protected with strong cryptography, and for most businesses the right answer is simply never to do it. Requirement 4.2.2 covers end-user messaging, which means email, instant messaging, SMS, and chat apps. Ordinary email is not encrypted end to end, so a card number in a message can sit readable on several mail servers. If a customer emails you a card number, don't reply with it quoted and don't forward it. Remove it from your systems following your data retention policy under Requirement 3, and ask the customer to pay through your checkout instead.

How does an ASV scan check Requirement 4?

A quarterly external scan under Requirement 11.3.2 tests every TLS service it can reach on your public addresses, not just your website. It reports SSL and early TLS, weak cipher suites, expired, self-signed, or mismatched certificates, and other weak settings. These are some of the most common reasons a first scan fails. ServerScan is a PCI Approved Scanning Vendor, and rescans are unlimited on every plan, so you can fix a TLS setting and check it again the same day. Our guide to common scan failures has fixes for the usual TLS findings, and the pricing page shows what a plan includes.

Go on to Requirement 5 - Malware.

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